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REGULATION A+: NEW AND IMPROVED AFTER
THE JOBS ACT OR A FAILED REVIVAL?
Neal Newmant
ABSTRACT
This piece is afollow-up to a previous article that I wrote on Regulation
A. In April of 2012, then-President Barack Obama szgned into lay
the Jumpstart our Business Start Ups JOBS) Act. Under the JOBS
Act's Title IV Congress made reisions to aprivate offerng exemption
referred to as Regulation A mith the intention of reviving an exempt
offering option that was close to dormant. The primay Regulation A
crticism being that issuers were required to do too much in terms of
providing business andfinancial disclosure where the most the issuer could
raise though a Regulation A offerng was $5 milon.
In response, the JOBS Act made several changes to Rgulation A; the
most notable change involved raising the offerng cap from $5 milon to
$50 mildon. In mpypreviouspiece, I roundly criticiZed the Regulation A
changes promulgated through the JOBS Act. In that previous article I
argued that Regulation A wasflawed at inception and that the changes
to Regulation A in sum did nothing to make the regulation more
appeang. The predous piece was speculative, however as the Securities
and Exchange Commission had not drafted its final rules until the
summer of2015. Thus the piece was pubshed before having the benefit
of assessing how issuers might respond to Regulation A as revised.
This current piece is the rare occasion where I double-back on the
assertions made in a previous article and see if in fact I was correct or
whether I missed the mark. In writing this follow up article, myfindings
were educational. The effort taught me to be ever vigilant about the
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intersection between the theoretical and the practical. My research revealed
that Regulation A has gron exfponentiall in terms of issuer use and
popularity which is contray to what I was expecting. Therefore, I was
wrong in that regard and I am fine ith acknowledging that.
To be fair and dispassionate, in this article I have concluded that
Regulation A, as revised, while still having some flaws, is an example of
Congress using its legislative powers to take something that was
structurally flawed and problematic and making it into something that
non) appears to be viable, usable, and more appeakng to emerging rowth
and start-up companies.
A word of caution, however. Myfindings also surfaced a callfor a healthy
dose of vigilance as well. There are storm clouds gathering over the
Regulation A offering exemption. The increased offering sites allowed
under Regulation A coupled nith the lack of investor sophistication
(dpnamics exclusive to Regulation A) could leave many investors exposed
to investing in companies that in hindsight thep would have been better off
taking a pass on. These issues and the corresponding discussions unfold
in the pages that follow.
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INTRODUCTION"
IN April of 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (hereinafter the "JOBS Act").' Under the JOBS Act's
Tide IV, Congress made revisions to a private offering exemption referred to
as "Regulation A" with the intention of reviving an exempt offering option that
was close to dormant.2 Before the passage of the JOBS Act, Regulation A was
This piece is a follow-up to a previous article that I wrote on Regulation A. See Neal
Newman, Let Sleeping Regs Lie: A Diatribe on Regulation A's Futilty Before and After the J.O.B.S.
Act, 18 U. PA.J. Bus. L. 65 (2016).
1 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306.
2 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, SECURITIEs REGULATION: FACTORS
THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS 9 (2012) [hereinafter GAO-12-
839] (showing that Regulation A filings had dwindled to nineteen in 2011 with the Securities
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used sparingly as it was primarily criticized for requiring too much for an
exemption that offered too little.3 For example, as will be discussed later in this
article, the most an issuer could raise using Regulation A prior to Regulation
A's revisions under the JOBS Act was $5 million in any twelve month period.
But the regulation required the issuer to prepare an offering circular referred to
as Form 1-A which required a great deal in terms of time and expense for
issuers to complete.4
In an effort to resuscitate Regulation A as a viable option for private
offerings, Congress, through the JOBS ACT, made several changes to the
exemption. The most notable of which involved raising the offering cap from
$5 million to $50 million.5 Nonetheless, in a previous article I authored,6 I
roundly criticized the proposed Regulation A changes promulgated through the
JOBS Act. I argued that Regulation A was flawed at inception and that the
prospective changes to Regulation A did nothing to make it more appealing.7
Those arguments were speculative, however, as the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (hereinafter the "SEC" or the "Commission") did not
draft its final rules until the summer of 2015.8 The article therefore was
published without the benefit of assessing how issuers responded to the
Regulation A revisions.
This piece provides an opportunity to revisit the assertions made in my
previous article to see if Regulation A, as revised ("Regulation A+"), has
become a more appealing offering exemption based on the number of
companies choosing to use Regulation A+ in lieu of other popular options such
and Exchange Commission qualifying only one of those offerings).
3 For example, as will be discussed later in this article, the most that an issuer could raise
using Regulation A prior to the passing of the JOBS Act was $5 million in any 12-month
period. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014), amended by 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2015).
4 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(i) (2014) (amended 2015).
s 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2015).
6 Neal Newman, Let Sleeping Regs Lie: A Diatribe on Regulation A's Futility Before and
After theJ.O.B.S. Act, 18 U. PA.J. Bus. L. 65, 84-107 (2015).
7 Id (In the prior article I roundly criticized Regulation A even in its revised form. My general
premise being that Regulation A in its revised form would still be too cumbersome for
issuers to comply with and the cost of doing a Regulation A offering would far outweigh
the benefits. That coupled with the argument that there were far more appealing offering
exemptions available such as Regulation D's Rule 506.).
8 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller




as Regulation D's Rule 506.9 Theoretically, issuers will choose Regulation A+
if and only if Regulation A+ provides more desirable features or options than
other offering exemptions (e.g., the inclusion of non-accredited and
unsophisticated investors).
Writing this article has been educational and a reminder to be ever vigilant
about the intersection between the theoretical and the practical: Not only has
the use of Regulation A grown exponentially, but the exemption may now rival
or even surpass its previously more popular predecessor, Regulation D's Rule
506.10 Regulation A+ is an example of Congress using its legislative powers to
take something that was structurally flawed and problematic and making it into
a regulation that, while still having some flaws, now appears to be more
appealing to emerging growth and start-up companies.
By the same token, Regulation A+ is not an unqualified success. The
considerable increase in the use of Regulation A has surfaced potential
problems such as the increased exposure of this option to "lay" investors; i.e.
investors with modest income, modest net worth, and little to no financial
sophistication. While, these are the investors that Regulation A actively seeks,
there are concerns about how issuers, regulators, and the market as a whole will
react if/when these investors suffer significant losses in this private equity
startup company space. These potential problems will be discussed in Section
VII.
But first this piece takes a step back. In order to give the reader context
and an appreciation for the tension between theoretical and practical
considerations this article is structured as follows. The first part contains an
overall assessment of Regulation A based on my research and findings. In Part
II, I provide some historical background on Regulation A and articulate
commonly perceived problems with Regulation A prior to its revisions under
the JOBS Act. Part III discusses the changes made by the JOBS Act; the
biggest modification being an increase to its offering cap from $5 million to
$50 million in any twelve-month period." Part IV contains a theoretical
discussion about why an issuer would choose Regulation A+ (Regulation A as
revised by the JOBS Act) over other offering exemption choices. In Part V,
the piece transitions from theory to practice by analyzing a sample of post
JOBS Act Regulation A filings to get a clear idea of the types of companies
9 See GAO-12-839, supra note 2, at 11 (showing that Regulation D filings far outnumbered
Regulation A filings during the time period studied).
to See discussion on this assertion in Section V infra.
it 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(A) (2012) ("The aggregate offering amount of all securities offered
and sold within the prior 12-month period in reliance on the exemption added in
accordance with this paragraph shall not exceed $50,000,000.").
12:243 (2018) 247
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making use of the revised exemption. Ultimately, Part VI attempts to answer
the main questions posed by this article: Why are issuers turning to Regulation
A+ in volumes? Were the revisions to Regulation A successful?
Part VII invokes a word of caution. Regulation A was designed to attract
"lay" investors (i.e., investors with modest income, modest net worth, and little
or no financial sophistication). The increase in the use of Regulation A+ has
given more of these investors exposure to the risks and rewards of emerging
growth private equity. The story of Elio Motors (a company that used a
Regulation A offering to raise nearly $16 million, but has yet to produce a single
car)12 illustrates the concerns of this increased exposure: What will the fallout
be from Regulation A+ if Elio Motors and other companies similarly situated
ultimately fail? Finally, the paper concludes.
I. OVERALL ASSESSMENTS
Is Regulation A+ as revised under the JOBS Act new and improved or was
the effort a failed attempt at revival? Although some may say that it is still too
early to decide whether revised Regulation A is in fact a success, early signs are
unequivocal that, at the very least, issuers have turned to Regulation A in
volumes. Additionally, interviews conducted with issuers that have used the
Regulation A+ exemption revealed that they were happy with their choice and
did not perceive some of the issues raised in this article as problematic.'3 The
remainder of this article explores how this conclusion was formed.
II. BACKGROUND OF REGULATION A
A. Securities Offerings in General
As a general rule, when a company issues its securities the company must
either register those securities or find an applicable exemption.14 The
underlying premise of this rule is that investors need information, including
financial information, to make an informed decision about whether or not to
12 For a detailed examination of the Elio Motors example, see Section VII infra.
13 See infra Section VI (discussing the results of our own in-depth interviews with Regulation
A filers).
14 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §§ 4-5, 48 Stat. 74, 77-78 (1933) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-e (2016)) (generally prohibiting persons from selling securities unless
those securities have been registered and providing exemptions to this general rule).
12:243 (2018)248
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invest in a particular company. This information needs to be disclosed through
the registration process so that it does not remain within the issuing company.
Issuers are required to register offerings when the respective offering is
public in nature.'5 The registration mechanism requires issuing companies to
file information publicly, via a "registration statement," so that potential
investors have access to this information.16 In contrast, when an offering is
not public in nature, the issuer can offer the securities under what are referred
to as "private exemptions."17 An "exemption" allows the issuer to offer the
securities without having to complete the cumbersome, expensive, time-
consuming registration process. The private offering regime is complicated
and it is beyond this article's scope to detail it completely. But, generally,
eligibility for a private offering exemption is a function of (1) offering size, (2)
investor wealth, and (3) investor sophistication.18 The smaller the offering size,
the more likely it is that the offering will be deemed private in nature, thus
obviating the requirement that the issuer register the securities.9 Likewise, if
the potential investor pool is comprised of wealthy or financially savvy
investors (the legal term of art for these individuals is "accredited investor"),2 0
the securities laws are less concerned with protecting this class of investors
since the law sees the wealthy or financially savvy investors as able to fend for
themselves.21
15 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2016) (stating that the provisions of section 77e shall not apply to
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering); 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2016)
(prohibiting securities from being publicly offered until a registration statement has been
filed).
16 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FORM S-1: REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 2 (2017) ("This form shall be used for the registration under the
Securities Act of 1933 ('Securities Act'); of securities of all registrants for which no other
form is authorized or prescribed . . . .").
17 See GAO-12-839, supranote 2, at 10-11 (reporting details of how issuers choose Regulation
D's Rule 506, the historically most often used private offering exemption, with much more
frequency than Regulation A).
18 For example, different rules within Regulation D include different offering caps, different
disclosure requirements, and different investor qualification requirements. 17 C.F.R.
230.504-06 (2017).
19 See Nonpublic Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962)
("Whether a transaction is one not involving any public offering is essentially a question of
fact and necessitates a consideration of all surrounding circumstances, including such
factors as the relationship between the offerees and the issuer, the nature, scope, size, type
and manner of the offering.").
20 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(6) (2017) (detailing the various entities and persons who fall
under the accredited investor definition).
21 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2017) ("The issuer is not required to furnish the specified
information to purchasers when it sells securities under [Rule 504], or to any accredited
12:243 (2018) 249
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B. Pre-JOBS Act Regulation A
Regulation A is a part of this exempt private offering regime. Prior to the
JOBS Act, the most an issuer could raise in any twelve-month period under a
Regulation A filing was five million dollars.22 Despite the relatively low offering
limit, the requirements for Regulation A compliance were onerous and time
consuming. First, the issuer had to complete an offering circular known as a
Form 1-A23: a twenty-nine page document that requires the issuer to provide
financial and other information.24 Form 1-A is comprehensive and takes
considerable time to complete. Many practitioners have compared the
completing of a Form 1-A as being equivalent to completing a full-blown
registration statement.25 Once completed, the issuer is required to file the Form
1-A with the Securities and Exchange Commission.26 In the SEC's hands, the
filing must go through a qualification process,27 which involves a review to
make sure that the necessary disclosures have been provided.28
In addition to filing Form 1-A, Regulation A required the issuer to register
its securities in each state the issuer intended on offering its securities so that it
was in compliance with state "Blue Sky" regulations.29 This was particularly
difficult as, naturally, each state has different filing criteria and requires a filing
investor.").
22 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014), amended by 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2017).
23 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(i) (2014) (amended 2015).
24 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FORM 1-A: REGULATION A OFFERING STATEMENT UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (2015) [hereinafter SEC FORM 1-A].
25 In drawing upon my own experiences as a practitioner spanning from 1998-2003, I never
considered Regulation A as a viable option for my clients based in large part on the
significant amount of time and expense that would be required to complete the Form 1-A
Offering Statement.
26 SEC FORM 1-A, supra note 24, at 1 ("The offering statement must be submitted or filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in electronic format by means of the
Commission's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval System (EDGAR).
27 See Investor Bu/etin: Regulation A, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (July 8, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ibregulationa.html ("For Tier 1
offerings, this offering circular must also be filed with, and is subject to review and
quakfication by, the staff at the SEC .. ..For Tier 2 offerings, the offering circular is subject
to review and quakfication by the staff at the SEC, but is not subject to review by state
securities regulators.").
28 Id
29 See GAO-12-839, supra note 2, at 13.
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fee. For example, New York charges a $300 fee if the offering is for less than
$500,000 and $1,200 if the offering is for $500,000 or more.30
As such, the federal Form 1-A filing, coupled with the state Blue Sky
registration requirements made for an offering regime that was tedious,
cumbersome, time consuming, and costly. Historically, this qualification
process for a Regulation A filing took an average of 228 days to complete'31 the
equivalent of a death sentence for any company that needed to raise money
quickly.
C. Regulation A's Historic Disfavor
This long, onerous, and expensive registration process incentivized few
issuers to use Regulation A in the past.32 Appendix A, below, includes a chart
that shows the declining use of Regulation A offerings filed in the period from
1992 to 2011.33 In 1992, for example, 20 filings claimed exempt status under
Regulation A, all of which were qualified by the SEC. Regulation A filings
peaked in 1997 at 116, but of those filings, only 57 of them were qualified.
Regulation A filings declined steadily from the 1997 high, dwindling down to
eleven filings in 2011, of which only one was qualified. Issuers had spoken
with their actions, clearly indicating that Regulation A was not the answer to
their capital raising needs.
In addition to the difficulty of using Regulation A, securities laws attorneys
speculated that Regulation A filings also may have declined due to issuers
having far more appealing options such as Regulation D's Rule 506 which is
exempt from state registration requirements. The exemption makes the rule
less cumbersome with which to comply.34 Regulation D's Rule 506 enabled
small business issuers to do the same things that Regulation A does (i.e. offer
securities without having to register them). But, generally, Regulation D's Rule
506 allowed issuers to raise far more money in much less time and at a fraction
of the cost.3 5 For example, as opposed to Regulation A, Regulation D's Rule
30 Regulation A State F/lug Requirements: New York, N. AM. SEC. ADM'RS ASS'N,
http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/coordinated-
review/regulation-a-offerings/state-filing-requirements/new-york/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2018).
31 See GAO-12-839, supra note 2, at 12.
32 See id. at 10-11 (showing the number of Regulation A filings compared to other
exemptions).
33 See infra Appendix A.
34 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017).
35 See infra p. 27 and note 157.
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506 places no limits on the offering amount as long as the issuer satisfies the
Rule's mandates.36 Rule 506 also does not have Regulation A's SEC filing
requirement.37 Rule 506 issuers merely have to notify the SEC that they are
doing a Rule 506 offering; there is no other filing or qualification process
required.38 Finally, and perhaps most compelling, Rule 506 offerings are
exempt from all state registration and filing requirements.39 Thus, many of the
most onerous requirements of Regulation A offerings are entirely absent from
Rule 506 offerings, making it a more efficient and less expensive capital raising
process.
Regulation D's Rule 506, however, does have some noteworthy
stipulations that Regulation A does not. First, Rule 506 places limits on the
types of investors that can participate in an offering: they must either be
accredited or financially savvy.40  An "accredited investor" is defined in
Regulation D's Rule 501. Among other things, an accredited investor is one
who either has a high net worth or one who eams a considerable amount of
income on an annual basis.41 Additionally, Regulation D places limits on the
number of investors who can invest. While Regulation D's Rule 506 places no
limits on accredited investor participation, the rule limits the number of non-
accredited investors to thirty five.42 This stipulation derives, as a policy matter,
from the belief that accredited investors can fend for themselves due to their
high net worth or high net income positions, and therefore do not need
government oversight for protection.
D. Regulation A vs. Regulation D, By the Numbers
Comparing the number of Rule 506 offerings to the number of Regulation
A offerings we see that, before the JOBS Act, issuers had a clear preference for
36 See general) 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017) (Issuers using Regulation D's Rule 506 have no
restrictions as to the offering amount).
37 Under Regulation D, issuers are merely required to provide notice to the SEC that they are
offering securities in an exempt offering and are relying on a Regulation D exemption. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2017).
38 Id.
39 See general) 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012) (amended 2015) (exempting under Section 18 of the
Securities Act of 1933 certain securities and securities offerings from state registration, but
not exempting offerings made under Regulation A (pre-JOBS Act)).
40 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2017).
41 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1), (5)-(6) (2017).
42 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2017).
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the Rule 506 offering exemption despite the fact that the 506 offerings are
limited to either accredited investors or financially savvy investors.
The Government Accounting Office ("GAO") conducted a study
comparing Rule 506 offerings to Regulation A filings.43 The study tracked
offerings between 2008 and 2011.44 Unfortunately, the GAO was unable to
find Rule 506 offering data for the periods covering 2008 and 2009.
Nonetheless, the resulting analysis is compelling. In 2008 and 2009, the SEC
qualified only eight and three Regulation A offerings, respectively.45 Similarly,
in 2010 and 2011 the number of Regulation A offerings that were qualified
totaled six and one, respectively.46 For comparison sake, the Office of the
Comptroller tallied only those Rule 506 offerings for $5 million or less-the
limit for Regulation A offerings at the time. In contrast to the low volume of
Regulation A filings, the number of Rule 506 offerings in 2010 and 2011 totaled
7,517 and 8,194, respectively.47
Based on this data, Rule 506 was clearly preferred through 2011. It is likely
that aspects of Rule 506 such as state preemption and the lack of a qualification
process were appealing to issuers. It is noteworthy that he limitations of Rule
506 offerings, such as the limit on types of issuers, did not deter the use of Rule
506 offerings-at least not prior to the JOBS Act's passing.
III. REGULATION A MODIFICATIONS UNDER THE JOBS ACT
A. In General
With the discussion in Parts I and II serving as important background, we
can appreciate the context that precipitated Congress' decision to revisit
Regulation A through Tide IV of the JOBS Act. It is important to note that
the SEC's final Regulation A rules resulted after much wrangling,48 primarily
with state regulators who opposed Regulation A because it preempted state
Blue Sky filing requirements.49  The SEC compromised by bifurcating
43 See GAO-12-839, supra note 2, at 11 (showing the number of Regulation A filings





48 Some state officials filed suit in court to challenge the rule legally and went after specific
aspects of the rule. See Newman, supra note 6, at 93 (outlining state regulator arguments on
the matter). See also lUndeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646, 648 (D.C. Or. 2016).
49 See Newman, supra note 6, at 93.
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Regulation A into two tiers: Tier 1 and Tier 2.5o Tier 1 offerings are limited to
offerings from $0 to $20 million.5 ' Tier 2 offerings are for offerings up to $50
million. 52  Tier 1 offerings are subject to the same state registration
requirements that were in effect prior to the JOBS Act's passing,53 whereas the
Tier 2 offerings are exempt from state registration requirement.54 Although
not subject to state registration, the Tier 2 offerings require much more in the
way of disclosure and compliance.55 Issuers can choose which tier they would
like to use simply by noting their selection in their filing and then comporting
their offering to comply with that tier's mandates.
B. The Specifics
1. Tier 1 Offerings: $0-$20 mil/on
Generally speaking, the Regulation A Tier 1 offering rules are exactly the
same as they were pre JOBS Act revisions-the notable exception being the
raising of the cap from $5 million to $20 million.5 6 Issuers are still required to
prepare and file Form 1-A,57 as well as to register their offering in each state in
which the issuer intends on offering its securities.58 As far as Tier 1 offerings
are concerned, the pressing question is whether raising the cap from $5 million
to $20 million is enough of an incentive to increase Regulation A filings. From
an issuer perspective, under the Tier 1 regime two big issuer deterrents remain
post JOBS Act: the SEC qualification requirement and the state registration
requirement. These obstacles remain substantial. In our sample of Regulation
50 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2017).
5 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1) (2017).
52 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2017).
53 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2016) (comparing Section 15 to Section 18 to show that Section 18
of the Securities Act of 1933 generally does not exempt Regulation A offerings from state
registration and filing requirements).
54 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2016) (exempting sales of securities to "qualified purchasers," as
defined by SEC rules, from state regulation of securities offerings). Regulation A's final
rules broadly define "qualified purchaser" as "any person to whom securities are offered or
sold pursuant to a Tier 2 offering of this Regulation A." 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2017).
55 See SEC FoRm 1-A, supra note 24, at Part F/S(c) (requiring audited financial statements for
Tier 2 Regulation A offerings).
56 Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1) (2017) (limiting Tier 1 prices to a maximum of $20
million), ith 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (limiting exemption amount o a maximum of
$5 million).
57 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (2017) (requiring the use of Form 1-A for Regulation A offerings).
58 See GAO-12-839, supra note 2, at 13-15.
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A+ filers, we found it took Tier 1 filers an average of 375 days to qualify, up
from 228 days before the JOBS Act.59
2. Tier 2 Offerings: $0-$50 milion
The most significant Regulation A revisions, however, occurred in the Tier
2 offering requirements. The first major change involved the raising of the
aggregate offering limit from $5 million to $50 million.60 This increased limit
triggers a host of additional requirements on the issuer's part, presumably to
offset the additional exposure to investors. In connection with the Form 1-A
filing, which must still be filed for Tier 2 offerings, the issuer must also include
audited financial statements.61
Additionally, Tier 2 filers must file these audited financial statements on an
ongoing basis.62 The exception to this reporting requirement occurs only when
the issuer has fewer than 300 shareholders.63 The filing of audited financial
statements is not an insignificant requirement. Generally speaking, preparation
of such statements can cost small business issuers anywhere from $10,000 to
$50,000 depending on the size of the company and the amount of work
required.64
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Tier 2 filings are exempt from all
state Blue Sky laws and registration requirements.65 This exemption for Tier 2
filers came about due to the SEC, in its final rule making, refusing to acquiesce
to state regulators who opposed state preemption for Regulation A offerings
regardless of size.66 In their opposition, state regulators argued that they were
in the best position to protect their residents from financial fraud or other
s9 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
60 See subra note 11 and accompanying text.
61 See SEC FoRm 1-A, supra note 24, at Part F/S(c) (requiring audited financial statements for
Tier 2 Regulation A offerings).
62 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (2017) (noting the documents that must be included with an
offering statement, including those contents required by Form 1-A); 17 C.F.R. §
230.252(f)(2) (noting post-qualification amendment requirements, including annual
financial statements); SEC FoRm 1-A, supra note 24, at Part F/S(c) (requiring audited
financial statements for Tier 2 Regulation A offerings).
63 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(d)(2) (2017).
64 See, e.g., Fig Pub., Inc., Regulation A Offering Statement (Form 1-A) (Dec. 21, 2015) (noting
fees for accounting or audits at $37,500); Medalist Diversified REIT, Inc., Regulation A
Offering Statement (Form 1-A) (Oct. 5, 2015) (noting fees for accounting or audits at
$65,500).
65 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
66 See generaly sources cited supra note 48.
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potential misdeeds in the private offering space as opposed to the federal
government.67 To bolster their argument, they pointed towards the number of
fraud instances that appear to accompany Rule 506 D offerings.68
Nonetheless, the SEC held firm to its position and exempted all Tier 2
filers from state filing or registration requirements.69 I applaud the SEC's
resolve. If the SEC had kept the state filing requirements in the final rule, the
state regulators would have all but insured that Regulation A+ would have been
as unappealing as its predecessor. In its current iteration, however, Regulation
A+ may have a chance of gaining traction as a popular exemption choice for
small businesses. In our sample of Regulation A+ filers, we found it took Tier
2 filers 120 days to qualify.70
IV. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CHOOSING REGULATION A
A thoughtful issuer will choose the offering that provides the best
combination of attributes corresponding to the issuer's situation. The issuer's
choice will be a function of the issuer's size, capital requirements, stage of
development, type of business, and the issuer's investor pool demographic.7 '
Individual circumstances, therefore, dictate the issuer's choice. So, what would
cause a thoughtful issuer to choose Regulation A+ over other options, such as
Regulation D's Rule 506? Regulation A+ will be selected when it provides
something unique and important to the issuer that other exemptions do not.
To that end, a side by side comparison of Regulation A+ and Regulation D's
Rule 506 follows to show which features are unique to each.
67 See, e.g., Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, Inc., to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 10, 14 (on file with author) (arguing that
maintaining state registration of Regulation A offerings will promote investor protections
by States as intended by Congress).
68 Id. at 14.
69 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2016) (exempting sales of securities to "qualified purchasers," as
defined by SEC rules, from state regulation of securities offerings). Regulation A's final
rules broadly define "qualified purchaser" as "any person to whom securities are offered or
sold pursuant to a Tier 2 offering of this Regulation A." 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2017).
70 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
71 Here I am drawing upon my prior experience as a practitioner. These are the variables we




A. Regulation A+ vs. Regulation D's Rule 506
1. Offering SiZe
As discussed earlier, Regulation A+ as revised allows the issuer to offer up
to $50 million of securities in any twelve-month period.72 The offering size for
Rule 506 is unlimited.73
2. Fing Requirements
Regulation A+, even as revised, still requires the issuer to complete and file
the formidable Form 1-A.74 Once completed, however, the full offering
circular can range anywhere from 50 to over 100 pages.75 Rule 506, on the
other hand, has no formal SEC filing requirement and no SEC qualification
process.76 Thus, while the Regulation A filer has to comply with the SEC's
qualification process (which may take up to two to three months even under
optimal circumstances), Rule 506 issuers can offer their shares immediately
with no SEC review or qualification process. Rule 506 issuers do, however,
have to notice the SEC whenever the issuer does a Regulation D offering. The
issuer is required to file a Form D, which asks for basic information about the
offering. The Form D is not subject to any review or qualification process,
however.77
3. Disclosure Requirements
As discussed earlier, Regulation A+ now has a two-tiered offering
structure. Tier 1 does not require audited financial statements. Tier 2 filers,
however, must include audited financial statements with its Form 1-A filing and
file audited financial statements with the SEC on an annual basis.78 Recall that
72 See sra note 11 and accompanying text.
73 See 17 C.F.R. §230.506 (2017).
74 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(i) (2017).
7s See, e.g., Medalist Diversified REIT, Inc., Offering Circular (Form 1-A) (Oct. 5, 2015)
(totaling 93 pages in length plus exhibits); AdvantaMeds Solutions USA Fund I, Inc.,
Offering Circular (Form 1-A) (Nov. 6, 2015) (totaling 78 pages in length plus exhibits).
76 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
77 All issuers that sell securities relying on Regulation D must file Form D. See Flng and
Amending a Form D Notice, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/formdguide.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
78 See supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text. See a/so 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(f)(2)(i) (2017)
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Tier 2 filers must file annual audited financial statements with the SEC
indefinitely following their Tier 2 offering,79 unless the issuer has fewer than
300 shareholders.80 Tier 1 filers have no such ongoing filing obligations. The
ongoing audited financial statement requirement is a fixed cost burden to which
Tier 2 filers are subject regardless of size, profitability, or other issuer
characteristics.
This rule assumes because the issuer has more than 300 shareholders it is
of sufficient size and infrastructure to absorb these costs. I question in how
many cases that holds true for Regulation A filers. Again, one of the unique
Regulation A characteristics (which will be discussed in further detail
momentarily), is that anyone can invest in a Regulation A offering regardless of
net worth, net income, or investor sophistication.81 In that regard, under a
Regulation A offering, it is conceivable that an issuer could have an investor
base with a high number of shareholders, but with each shareholder investing
nominal amounts. The end result would be a high number of shareholders but
a modest-if not small-capital yield from the offering. Issuers in this
predicament would nonetheless be required to provide audited financial
statements on an annual basis but may not have the requisite size or
infrastructure to be able to absorb such cost while still having sufficient capital
to execute their business plans. The ongoing audited financial statement
requirement for Regulation A Tier 2 filers is yet another area where the SEC
may have overburdened issuers.
For a Rule 506 offering, the disclosure requirements are a bit more
involved, but do not involve audited financial statements. When shares are
issued to non-accredited investors under Rule 506, the disclosure regime is
graduated based on the offering size.82 Generally speaking, larger offering sizes
require more disclosures.83 These disclosure requirements include both non-
financial and financial statement information.84 On the other hand, issuers are
not required to provide financial and business disclosures to accredited
investors.85 But as a practical matter, issuers will provide the same information
(discussing annual filing requirements).
79 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(f)(2)(i) (2017) (discussing annual filing requirements).
so See 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(d)(2) (2017).
81 See general 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (2017) (placing no stipulations on the investor's
qualifications and, by inference, allowing anyone to invest in a Regulation A offering
regardless of net worth, income, or financial sophistication).
82 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B) (2017).
83 Id.
84 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B) (2017).
85 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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to accredited investors that it provides to non-accredited investors because of
Rule 10b-5's anti-fraud provisions.86
The Rule 506 issuer is required to provide the same non-financial
information that would be required in a Form 1-A offering circular.87 If the
issuer is not Regulation A eligible, on the other hand, then the issuer must
provide "the same kind of information as required in Part I of a registration
statement filed under the Securities Act on the form that the issuer would be
entitled to use."88 Unlike Regulation A+ Tier 2, Rule 506 does not require
issuers to prepare ongoing disclosures.
The Rule 506 financial statement disclosure requirements are based on
offering size: (1) offerings up to $2 million, (2) offerings up to $7.5 million, and
(3) offerings over $7.5 million. The greater the offering size, the more the issuer
is required to disclose to the non-accredited investor about the issuer's financial
condition.89 For offerings up to $2 million, the issuer is required to provide
audited financial statements for the two previous years.90 For offerings up to
$7.5 million, the issuer must provide "the financial statement information
required in Form S-1 for smaller reporting companies."9 1 And finally, for
offerings greater than $7.5 million, the issuer must provide "the financial
statements as would be required in a registration statement filed under the
[1933] Act on the form that the issuer would be entitled to use."92
Which provision is more preferable in the area of financial reporting? This
call is a close one, but I might give the edge to Regulation A. Tier 1 offerings
have no audited financial statement requirement at filing, but Tier 2 offerings
do.9 3 Rule 506 has the complicated graduated scale, which is a function of
offering size, and investor demographic. Recall that issuers are not required to
provide disclosures of any kind to accredited investors, but must provide this
financial information to others.94 The argument for Regulation A being the
86 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2017).
87 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A) (2017).
88 Id.
89 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2) (2017).
90 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2) (i) (B) (1) (2017) (noting that the issuer must include information
required in Article 8 of Regulation S-X, which generally requires audited financial
statements for the two previous years, but here, only the issuer's balance sheet must be
audited).
91 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)(2) (2017).
92 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)(3) (2017).
93 See SEC FoRm 1-A, supra note 24, at Part F/S(c) (requiring audited financial statements for
Tier 2 Regulation A offerings).
94 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2017).
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preferred choice here is that the requirement is simple; audited financial
information is required for all Tier 2 filers-period.9 5 If one were being highly
nuanced on the financial disclosure question, then the argument for Rule 506
would be: if all the issuer's investors were accredited, then the need for any
financial statement disclosures by law would not be required.
But as mentioned earlier, federal securities law is a complicated creature to
grapple with; it is full of idiosyncrasies and hidden traps for the unwary. As a
practical matter, it is good practice to provide financial and business
information to all of your investors, regardless of demographic. This is so
because under Rule 10b-5, an issuer can be held liable if the issuer, among
other things, fails to disclose material information.96 By providing complete
and accurate information to all of its investors, the issuer avoids this potential
disclosure snag.
4. The Accredited Investor or 'Financialy Savgy Requirements"
As mentioned earlier, the fact that anyone can invest in a Regulation A
offering regardless of net worth, net income, or financial sophistication, is a
unique characteristic of Regulation A.97 The only limit placed on Regulation
A+ investors is the amount they invest. Regulation A investors who are not
accredited can invest no more than ten percent of their net worth or ten percent
of their income, whichever is greater.98 Interviews conducted with selected
companies reveal that issuers address Regulation A's ten percent net income
and net worth limits simply by having the investors attest to being within
them.99
9s See SEC FoRm 1-A, supra note 24, at Part F/S(c) (requiring audited financial statements for
Tier 2 Regulation A offerings).
96 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). Rule 10b-5 is the general anti-fraud provision of the federal
securities laws which can hold aqyone liable for violating the federal securities laws if they
are fraudulent in either the buying or selling of a security. The Rule 506 offerings would be
subject to this general provision, which is why issuers may often choose to provide financial
information even where all the investors are accredited. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017).
Now, the issuer could choose to provide unaudited financial information, which would
substantially cut down on the cost of providing such information.
97 See general) 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (2017) (placing no stipulations on the investor's
qualifications and, by inference, allowing anyone to invest in a Regulation A offering
regardless of net worth, income, or financial sophistication).
98 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C) (2017).
99 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(D) (2017). Typically, the investors make this attestation in
the subscription agreement that they sign as a precursor to taking ownership of the stock.
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In contrast to Regulation A, Rule 506 investors must be accredited, or at
the very least, financially savvy.00 In Sections V and VI we will drill down on
this characteristic a bit more to determine whether having access to a limitless
investor pool-regardless of net worth, net income, or financial
sophistication-is a consistent and clear advantage that Regulation A has over
Regulation D's Rule 506.
5. Restncted Shares
When shares are "restricted," the shareholder may not sell those shares
unless the shares are registered or the shares are issued under another applicable
exemption.101 Regulation A shares are "unrestricted", which means that the
holder of those shares can re-sell those shares freely, and does not have to
worry about having the shares registered or finding an applicable exemption.
Rule 506 shares, on the other hand, are restricted shares, and therefore the
shareholder cannot re-sell those shares unless they are registered or resold
relying on an applicable exemption.102 Again, all things being equal, the edge
appears to go toward the Regulation A+ filer. Having freely tradeable shares
upon receipt gives the investor a flexibility option that Rule 506 does not
provide. We will drill down on this in the following section to see if there are
some caveats to this apparent advantage.
6. 'Testing the Waters"
The Regulation A+ offering exemption also has what is referred to as a
"Testing the Waters" provision.103 This provision allows issuers to gauge the
interests of prospective investors before actually undergoing the SEC's
qualification process. So, the issuer can get indications of investor interest for
1oo See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2017) (requiring investors who are not accredited to have
"such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that [they are] capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably
believes immediately prior to making any sale that purchaser comes within this description,"
which has come to be referred to as the "financially savvy" requirement).
101 This Rule stems from the '33 Act's general construction. The '33 Act's Section 5 prohibits
the sale of unregistered securities. But we are also aware of the numerous exceptions to
this general rule where issuers can sell securities under an applicable exemption. Regulation
A and Regulation D's Rule 506 being among the possible exemptions.
102 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017). Understand, these shares are restricted by virtue of the fact
that they have not been registered, as the shares have been issued under the Regulation D
Rule 506 exemption.
103 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a) (2017).
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its company before deciding on whether or not the issuer wants to offer the
security for sale, and thus go through the SEC's qualification process and any
applicable state registration requirements. The "Testing the Waters" provision,
however, cannot be compared directly to Rule 506 because Rule 506 does not
have a filing requirement at all. Rule 506 issuers can commence selling their
shares right away; the only big compliance hurdles facing Rule 506 issuers
involve determining whether their investors are accredited, and then making
sure that those investors receive any financial and non-financial disclosures
accordingly.
B. But are the Regulation A+ Advantages Really Advantages?
In sum, Regulation A+ has several distinct features: the ability to issue
shares to anyone regardless of their net worth, net income, or their financial
status; selling unrestricted shares; and the ability to "test the waters" before
undergoing the qualification process. Are these distinctive characteristics
attractive enough to cause an issuer to forego other options, including the
apparenty superior features that Rule 506, for example, would provide?
In my previous article, I questioned whether being able to issue shares to
anyone regardless of net worth, net income, or investor sophistication was
really an advantage.104 I took the position that if your primary motivation for
choosing Regulation A+ was so that you could cast your investor net as wide
as possible so as to capture those who were neither accredited investors nor
financially savvy, that might not be a good thing.
The rationale in my previous article for taking this position was: if you are
not an accredited investor (i.e. someone who does not have a net worth
exceeding $1 million or a net income of at least $200,000), nor a person who is
"financially savvy," 0 5 then presumably you are a person who may be operating
at a more modest disposable income level. Likewise, if you are not "financially
savvy," presumably you are the type of investor who may be treading in
unfamiliar territory.106 I argued that an investor pool consisting predominantly
104 See Newman, supra note 6, at 87.
105 The rule, in relevant part, reads, "Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either
alone or with his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment. . . ." 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2017).
106 See Newman, supra note 6, at 87.
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of low net income, or low net worth investors who have limited investment
knowledge would be less than ideal for any issuer.107
First, if an investor is neither a high net worth nor a high net income
individual, then that person presumably is investing money that he or she can
ill afford to lose.108 It is logical to conclude that investors of this nature could
prove burdensome for the issuer.109 One can envision the issuer having to
spend a great deal of time easing fears of nervous and unenlightened investors
who may have invested money that will make an appreciable impact on their
lives if lost.110
Granted, if the investor is not an accredited investor, Regulation A+ limits
the investment amount to the greater of 10% of the investor's net worth, or
10% of the investor's annual net income."' But ten percent from someone
making $50,000 a year ($5,000) will have a much more significant financial
impact on that person than would a ten percent investment from someone
making $150,000 ($15,000). The overall point here is that if relatively lower
income individuals end up investing there is a much higher likelihood that these
individuals could be investing money that they can ill afford to lose. Given
their potential lack of financial sophistication, it is foreseeable, if not likely, that
this will be happening with greater frequency under Regulation A+.
Second, Regulation A+ assumes that, because Regulation A+ offerings are
open to anyone regardless of net worth or financial sophistication, there is a
critical mass of modestly wealthy individuals who are not financially savvy but
who are willing, able, and interested in investing in emerging growth
companies. However, given the apparent success of a number of Regulation
A filers (discussed in the following section), it appears that these investors do
exist and are numerous enough to support a number of Regulation A filings.
My initial reservations on this point seem to be unfounded.
Third, Regulation A+ shares are unrestricted. The ability of investors to
freely resell the securities on the secondary market has obvious appeal,
assuming the company continues to grow and thus there is secondary market
appeal for the shares. However, the existence of secondary market appeal is a
strong assumption to make in most cases. As will be discussed in Part V below,
very few of these companies are likely to grow past their fledgling startup phase





"I See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C) (2017).
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it is not entirely clear, as a theoretical matter, whether the unrestricted nature
of Regulation A+ shares is an appealing characteristic or not.
Fourth, Regulation A's "Testing the Waters" provision provides significant
advantages to the emerging growth company, as it allows these companies to
see if this exemption will work best for them prior to expending the resources
required to undertake it. How this works mechanically is the issuer submits its
Regulation A filing to the SEC, but before the filing undergoes the qualification
process, the issuer can solicit investors either orally or in writing to determine
whether the investor has any interest in the proposed securities offering.112
This "Testing the Waters" provision is equivalent to taking a car for a test drive
before buying it. Just as the potential car buyer is under no obligation to
purchase the car, those investors who have given "indications of interest" are
not obligated to purchase the shares.
Finally, Regulation A+'s disclosure requirements seem to be preferable to
Rule 506's because they are simpler. Regulation A+ merely requires that all
Tier 2 filers provide audited financial information."3 One might argue that
Rule 506's financial disclosure provisions are preferable, since no financial
disclosure is required at all if all the issuer's investors are accredited. However,
as mentioned earlier, federal securities law is full of idiosyncrasies and traps for
the unwary. Regardless of the regulations, as a practical matter, an issuer should
provide financial and business information to all investors so as to avoid
liability under Rule 10b-5 for failure to disclose material information.114
V. How HAVE ISSUERS RESPONDED?
Thus far, everything I have alleged about the implications of Regulation
A+'s provisions is theoretical and speculative. The remainder of this article
explores how issuers actually perceive and use Regulation A+ in practice. I do
this by assessing (1) a sample of Regulation A filings and analyzing those filings
to see what we can learn from them; and (2) interviewing a select group of
112 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a) (2017).
113 See SEC FoRm 1-A, supra note 24, at Part F/S(c) (requiring audited financial statements for
Tier 2 Regulation A offerings).
114 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). Rule 10b-5 is the general anti-fraud provision of the federal
securities laws which can hold aqyone liable for violating the federal securities laws if they
are fraudulent in either the buying or selling of a security. The Rule 506 offerings would be
subject to this general provision, which is why issuers may often choose to provide financial
information even where all the investors are accredited. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017).
Now, the issuer could choose to provide unaudited financial information, which would
substantially cut down on the cost of providing such information.
12:243 (2018)264
Regulation A+
Regulation A filers to get first-hand accounts as to why Regulation A was their
exempt offering choice and feedback about their experience with it.
A. The Numbers behind the Story
In contrast to my predictions and speculation that Regulation A+ would
be no more appealing than Regulation A's initial version, since the JOBS Act's
passage in 2012, there has been a significant increase in Regulation A filings.115
Specifically, 267 Regulation A+ filings were filed between August 13, 2012 and
May 24, 2016, as compared to 2011 when there were only 11 Regulation A
applications filed, of which only one was qualified.116 Thus my focus is: What
is the story behind these numbers and what is the reason for this significant
uptick in Regulation A filings? Is it a fad or is there some clear rationale for
the significant increase in issuers now choosing the Regulation A exemption as
opposed to the historically more popular Rule 506 Regulation D exemption?
What is more, I am specifically concerned with whether Regulation A is
providing some kind of advantage that other exemptions are not, for that would
be the only logical reason for choosing Regulation A over other options.
Of the over 267 Regulation A+ filings that were filed between August 13,
2012 and May 24, 2016 I sampled a subset of 48 of these filings.117 I looked at
a number of variables such as the maximum and minimum offering amounts,
the size of the issuers in terms of assets, liabilities, revenues, and income. I also
looked at the number of days between the issuer submitting its Regulation A
filing and the SEC qualifying the offering.118 Ultimately, the sampled filings
revealed some interesting trends.
Of the sampled filings, 19 were Tier 1 filings (39.6 percent) and the
remaining 29 were Tier 2 filings (60.4percent).119 The average minimum
offering amount over the entire sample size was $829,861 and the average
maximum offering size over the entire sample was $17,677,397.120 Average
total assets over the entire sample were $6,215,061 with average total liabilities
115 See supra Section I (discussing increase in Regulation A filings).
116 See infra Appendix A.
117 See infra Appendix B, Section I to view companies sampled.
118 The companies sampled are tabulated and summarized in Appendix B. Sample results are
discussed in Section V.
119 See infra Appendix B, Section I - Summation for "Tier" column.
120 See infra Appendix B, Section I - Summations for "Min. Offering Amt." and "Max. Offering
Amt." columns.
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at $5,829,579, which leaves an average total net worth of $385,482.121
Additionally, average revenue over the sample was $391,377, which resulted in
an average net loss of $314,238.122 Thus, one can readily conclude that the
majority of the companies issuing securities under Regulation A are not very
large, and that Tier 2 offering amounts are not approaching the statutory $50
million limit. Additionally, on average these companies are not yet profitable 23
1. Anayzing the Tier I Data
The Tier 1 offerings reveal some interesting observations. The average
maximum offering amount for the Tier 1 filer was $7,643,434, just $2.6 million
over the previous limit of $5 million.124 The average total assets for the Tier 1
filer was $13,168,719.125 Average total revenue for the Tier 1 filer was $54,071,
which resulted in an average net loss for all Tier 1 filers of $34,182 per
company.126 These numbers suggest hat most Tier 1 filers are unlikely to need
$20 million of raised capital. This observation is corroborated by the fact that
very few Tier 1 filers even came close to seeking the $20 million offering limit.
In fact, in our sample, only three out of the 21 Tier 1 filers actually sought the
maximum $20 million offering amount. Only two out of these three were
actually qualified.127 The next two highest filers each sought maximum offering
amounts of $14 million.128
Additionally, the average number of days that it took for the Tier 1 filers
in our sample to get qualified was 375 days, 147 days longer than the pre-
revision average.129 This suggests that the revisions have not improved the
efficiency of the qualification process. In fairness, this sample size was taken
right after the JOBS Act had just been passed. Thus, any improvements or
efficiencies that may have been implemented under revised Regulation A may
121 See infra Appendix B, Section I - Summations for "Total Assets", "Total Liabilities", and
"Net Worth" columns.
122 See infra Appendix B, Section I - Summations for "Revenue" and "Net Income" columns.
123 See infra Appendix B, Section I - Summation for "Net Income" column.
124 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
125 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
126 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
127 See infraAppendix B, Section I -AdvantaMeds (filed Nov. 6,2015), San Carlos Resort, LLC
(filed Jan. 7, 2016), and 360 Sports, Inc. (filed Jan. 22, 2016) (all seeking the maximum of
$20 million allowed under Tier 1 Regulation A filings).
128 See infra Appendix B, Section I - Mountain Top 81, LLC (filed Mar. 25, 2016) and Pine
Ridge Apartments, LLC (filed Apr. 1, 2016).
129 See infra Appendix B, Section II. Recall that before implementation of the JOBS Act, it
took an average of 228 days for Regulation A filers to get qualified. See supra Section II.B.
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not have manifested during the time period in which the Regulation A+ filings
were reviewed. Only 57.1 percent (12 of the 21 Tier 1 filers in our sample)
received SEC qualification.130 The remaining nine, for various reasons, never
got their Regulation A offering qualified with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.131
1.1. Takeaway Points
a. Even though the JOBS Act revisions allow for Tier 1 issuers a
maximum raise of $20 million in any 12-month period, the Tier 1 filers in our
sample still tended to be closer to the $5 million offering size which was the
maximum amount allowed under the old regime.132
b. Even under the revised Regulation A, the time period for an issuer
submitting a Tier 1 filing and getting qualified was just as long, if not longer,
than the average time for qualification under the old regime.133 This is of course
with the caveat that improvements or efficiencies under the new Regulation A
may not have manifested during the time period covering our sample.
c. With average total assets for Tier 1 filers at approximately $13.2 million
and average revenue at $54,071, it is most likely the case that most Tier 1 filers
are not sizeable enough to need $20 million of raised capital. In fact, very few
Tier 1 filers even came close to seeking the new offering maximum. In our
sample, only three out of the 21 Tier 1 filers actually sought the maximum and
only two were actually qualified, requiring 59 and 73 days respectively to reach
the qualification point.134 The next two highest filers each sought maximum
offering amounts of $14 million. 35
130 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
131 An issuer may not get qualified for a number of reasons. The issuer may go out of business
during the course of trying to obtain funding, or the issuer may simply lose interest in the
Reg. A filing while trying to comport with the SEC's qualification process.
132 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2017).
133 See infra Appendix B. Recall that before implementation of theJOBS Act, it took an average
of 228 days for Regulation A filers to get qualified. See supra Section II B.
134 See infraAppendix B, Section I -AdvantaMeds (filed Nov. 6,2015), San Carlos Resort, LLC
(filed Jan. 7, 2016), and 360 Sports, Inc. (filed Jan. 22, 2016) (all seeking the maximum of
$20 million allowed under Tier 1 Regulation A filings).
135 See infra Appendix B, Section I - Mountain Top 81, LLC (filed Mar. 25, 2016) and Pine
Ridge Apartments, LLC (filed Apr. 1, 2016).
12:243 (2018) 267
Virginia Law & Business Review
2. Anayzing the Tier 2 Data
The average maximum Tier 2 offering price was just over $23 million.' 36
The SEC qualified 17 of the 29 Tier 2 filers (58.6 percent) comprising our
sample.'37 It took the SEC an average of 120 days to qualify those Tier 2
filings.138 Average total assets for Tier 2 filers was $751,028, with a similar level
of total liabilities at $795,102.139 Average revenue for Tier 2 filers was $612,371
with an average net loss of $481,334.140
Although a Tier 2 offering allows an issuer to raise up to $50 million in any
twelve month period, the average maximum offering size was just over $23
millionl41-close to the Tier 1 offering maximum.142 Only eight of the 29 Tier
2 filers in the sample sought the maximum $50 million offering size.143 One
additional company listed its maximum offering size at $49 million.144 The SEC
qualified six out of the eight Tier 2 filers that were seeking the $50 million
maximum offering amount. On average, the SEC qualified Tier 2 offerings
much more quickly than the Tier 1 offerings. The shorter qualification times
are likely attributed to the SEC streamlining its qualification process as it gets
used to operating under the revised Regulation A rules.
VI. WHY ARE ISSUERS CHOOSING REGUILATION A?
A. Post-JOBS Act Analysis
The analysis of Regulation A's provisions before and after the JOBS Act
reveals that several of the issues that made Regulation A so unappealing-
namely the state registration requirements for all Tier 1 filers and the long lead
times between filing and qualification-survived the revisions. Tier 2 filers
136 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
137 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
138 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
139 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
140 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
141 See infra Appendix B, Section II.
142 See sra note 11 and accompanying text.
143 See infra Appendix B, Section I. The eight filers seeking the maximum offering size were:
Medalist Diversified REIT, Inc.; Punch TV Studios, Inc.; Hamilton National Income Trust,
Inc.; GK Investment Holdings, LLC; Cottonwood Multifamily REIT, Inc.; Brewdog USA,
Inc.; ThrillCorp, Inc.; and American Homeowner Preservation, LLC.
144 See infra Appendix B, Section I (Teraphysics Corp.).
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have it worse since they must provide audited financial statements in the filing
and adhere to ongoing periodic reporting requirements.145
What can explain, then, the dramatic increase in the volume of Regulation
A+ filings? The answer perhaps lies in the technology that has evolved with
respect to equity offerings. In private equity offerings, as in so many other
venues, the internet has fundamentally changed the way business is conducted.
Private equity offerings are now being offered through crowdfunding platforms
such as SeedInvest, that connect startups with investors online.146 SeedInvest
was founded in 2012 and launched in 2013.147 A visit to their website shows a
menu of companies, each offering their securities through the SeedInvest
online portal.148 These companies are using their portal to offer their securities
through Regulation A, as well as other exempt transaction rules.149
The ability to offer equity through these portals may help explain the rise
in demand for Regulation A offerings. These portals give the Regulation A
filer access to an unlimited pool of potential investors. Since Regulation A,
unlike Rule 506(b) or 506(c), does not have any investor qualification
stipulations,150 Regulation A filers can offer securities to all investors without
doing any screening or due diligence.
Despite the initial appeal of this option, managing a large shareholder
class-particularly one composed primarily of unsophisticated investors-
could pose long-term challenges for young companies. Foreseeable is a
situation where an issuer has offered shares under the Regulation A exemption
but four or five years after the offering, the company still has yet to achieve
profitability. Unsophisticated investors, those not steeped in the speculative
nature of investing in startup companies, may require a lot of hand-holding on
the issuer's part. Frequent inquiries to the company as to when profitability is
expected or when the investor may see returns on his investment are all
plausible fallouts. Granted, this is all speculative at this point. But early signs
are already pointing in this direction.15
145 See su/ra note 55 and accompanying text. See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(f)(2)(i) (discussing
annual filing requirements).
146 See Live Startups, SEEDINVEST, https://www.seedinvest.com/offerings (last visited Jan. 20,
2018).
147 See Our StoU, SEEDINVEST, https://www.seedinvest.com/about (last visitedJan. 20, 2018).
148 See live Startups, SEEDINVEST, supra note 146.
149 See id.
150 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
151 See the discussion of the Rlio Motors example in Section VII infra.
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The burdens of a large investor class are particularly pronounced for Tier
2 filers. They are required to provide audited financial statements on an annual
basis,152 unless their shareholder class declines below 300 members.153 Given
the investment limitations placed on investors in Regulation A offerings, we
can infer that the typical Regulation A Tier 2 investor will be investing in
relatively low amounts and therefore the number of investors is likely to be
high enough that the 300 shareholder threshold would easily be exceeded.154
Additionally, a thoughtful issuer should choose an offering exemption that
is both cost and time efficient. Neither Regulation A's Tier 1 or Tier 2 offering
regimes fall into this category. Tier 1 involves state registration requirements,
and Tier 2 has its audited financial statement and ongoing periodic reporting
requirements.
The ongoing periodic reporting requirement, which includes audited
financial statements, is costly, particularly for the smaller companies that are
choosing the Regulation A offering exemption. As the sample of Regulation
A+ filers illustrates, many of these companies are not generating revenue of
any significant size, and are, on average, operating at a net loss.15 5 So, few of
these companies have the ability to readily absorb the compliance costs of a
Tier 2 filer. The annual audit costs alone could equal 10 or 20 percent of the
company's operating revenue.15 6 The logic in going the Regulation A Tier 2
route is just not there, at least not in theory.
Furthermore, the time lag between the Regulation A filing and SEC
qualification, although improving, still involves a considerable amount of time.
This waiting period could get shorter over time as both the SEC and its issuers
become more familiar with the process, but the mere existence of a
qualification process gives Regulation A+ a greater burden than other exempt
offering regulations.
Based on the above analysis, it would seem that the only rationale for
choosing the Regulation A exemption-as opposed to Regulation D's Rule
152 See SEC FoRm 1-A, supra note 24, at Part F/S(c) (requiring audited financial statements for
Tier 2 Regulation A offerings). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(f)(2)(i) (discussing annual filing
requirements).
153 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(d)(2) (2017).
154 For example, a modest $5 million offering with a minimum investment of $500 per
shareholder would then result in a maximum of 10,000 shareholders.
1ss See infra Appendix B, Section II (noting the average net loss of $34,188 and $481,334 for
Tier 1 and Tier 2 filers respectively).
156 See, e.g., Fig Pub., Inc., Regulation A Offering Statement (Form 1-A) (Dec. 21, 2015) (noting
accounting fees of $37,500 while recording no revenue for the period covering Oct. 27,
2014 (inception) to Sep. 30, 2015).
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506-would be if the issuer were specifically targeting non-accredited investors
and expected that these non-accredited investors would comprise the bulk of
the issuer's investor base.157
B. Actual Companies and Their Experience with Regulation A+
In order to supplement these theoretical considerations, I interviewed a
select group of companies to get their perspective on their choice to offer
securities using Regulation A+. Their responses, below, are insightful, and lead
to a different conclusion than the purely theoretical analysis.
KEEN HOME: One of the first companies I talked to was Keen Home,
Inc.158 Keen Home appeared on the ABC syndicated show Shark Tank back
in February, 2015.159 The two co-founders, Ryan Fant and Nayeem Hussain
made their pitch to the Sharks. 160 The Sharks found the Keen Home product
and concept intriguing, and several of them engaged in a bidding war for the
opportunity to invest.161 The two founders ultimately ended up accepting
Robert Herjavec's offer, which was $750,000 in exchange for a 13 percent
equity stake in the company.162 Keen Home's product is "the world's first
smart venting product for homes with central HVAC. The Keen Home Smart
Vent regulates a home's heating/cooling airflow on a room-by-room level,
which the company believes results in improved comfort and efficiency."163
157 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017) (providing exemption for limited offers and sales without
regard to the dollar amount of the offering as long as certain conditions are met).
158 Telephone Interview with Ryan Fant, Co-Founder and COO, Keen Home (Mar. 2, 2017)
(on file with author).
159 Shark Tank is a business themed reality show where the Sharks, a group of self-made
tycoons, look for new business ventures in which to invest. Entrepreneurs make their
pitches and attempt to convince the Sharks to invest money into their companies. About
Shark Tank, ABC, http://abc.go.com/shows/shark-tank/about-the-show (last visited Jan.
20, 2018).
160 Shark Tank: Week 19: LuminAID, Ta/luma Totes, Keen Home, Scholy (ABC television broadcast
Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Shark Tank: Week 19]. The two founders, Ryan Fant and
Nayeem Hussain, made their pitch to the sharks in the episode that aired in the "Week 19"
episode of Season 6.
161 See id. (video clip available as of Nov. 15, 2017 at http://abc.go.com/shows/shark-
tank/video/pl5539712/VDKA0 tefllkb).
162 Steph Bazzle, Shark Tank: Robert Hejavec Puts $750k in Keen Home's Smart Vents, BuS. 2
COMMUNITY (Feb. 20, 2015),
http://www.business2community.com/entertainment/shark-tank-robert-herjavec-puts-
750k-keen-homes-smart-vents-01165071#Av01d4aOWDcAISDh.97.
163 Keen Home, Inc., Preliminary Offering Circular (Form 1-A), 4 (Nov. 10, 2016).
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Keen Home's appearance on Shark Tank served as the backdrop for my
interview in March of 2017 with one of the two co-founders, Ryan Fant.
Regarding Keen Home's decision to use Regulation A, Mr. Fant explained that
Keen Home was a consumer product and that right now the company was
trying to build brand awareness and grow their business.164 When Keen Home
explored private offering exemptions, they did not know much about
Regulation A, but saw Regulation A as an opportunity to capitalize on buzz
about the company created by their appearance on the show.165 Mr. Fant saw
the Regulation A offering as an opportunity to capitalize on that awareness by
helping them build both their capital and brand awareness through their
investors. As Mr. Fant explained, their thinking was that their investors would
be their "evangelists"-that they would get the word out about the product
and would use it as well.
Keen Home, Inc. filed their Regulation A offering on November 10, 2016
and the SEC qualified them on February 1, 2017. As of March 2, 2017, Keen
Home had raised $1,871,427 through its Regulation A offering.166 Keen Home
was seeking to raise $7,400,000 total from this offering.167 Mr. Fant stated that
they were happy with their capital raising results up to that point. He noted
that the Company was past their halfway point and the offering had only been
open for one month. He was confident that they would meet their $7.4 million
target.
Mr. Fant acknowledged that he was not thrilled about the costs associated
with complying with the ongoing financial reporting requirements, but he also
did not think that they were extreme. He explained that he thought it was good
to get "financial integrity" in place. He felt the reporting requirements helped
institute "financial integrity"; he thought that it was a "best practice" to engage
in the practice of compiling and preparing audited financial statements.
Finally, Mr. Fant noted that the anticipated capital infusion was creating
excitement within the company, as they would now have much needed capital
for research and development. He noted that Keen Home would be working
164 Telephone Interview with Ryan Fant, supra note 158.
165 Id.
166 Keen Home conducted its offering through Seedinvest.com. Their capital raising efforts
to date were gathered by referencing the seedinvest.com website and looking up Keen
Home's offering. See Invest in Keen Home, SEEDINVEST,
https://www.seedinvest.com/keenhome/series.a (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).




with companies such as Echo, Amazon, and Electra so that they could integrate
their product with those applications.
Keen Home was incorporated in March of 2013.168 Total assets for the
years ending 2016 and 2015 were $863,916 and $1,762,309, respectively.169
Total liabilities for those same periods were $3,943,174 and $3,133,686, which
resulted in negative net worth amounts of $3,079,258 and $1,371,377,
respectively.170 For the twelve-month period ending December 31, 2016, the
company showed a net loss of $2,069,131, but only reported revenue of
$915,051.171 Similarly, for the twelve-month period ending December 31, 2015,
the company showed a net loss of $2,198,965, after net revenue of
$1,005,267.172
KNIGHTSCOPE, INC.: On February 21, 2017, I spoke with William
Santana Li, Knightscope Inc.'s Chairman and CEO about their Regulation A
offering173 through SeedInvest.174 Knightscope sells security robots called
Autonomous Data Machines ("ADMs") that can be deployed either inside a
place of business or around the building's perimeter to monitor the area for
suspicious activity and report any intrusion.175 The company claims that these
robots monitor better, are less expensive, and are more reliable than human
security.176
Knightscope submitted its initial Regulation A filing on November 7,
2016.177 The company received its qualification on December 23, 2016.178 As
of October 4,2017, Knightscope had raised $17,689,348.179 When asked about
his company's choice in choosing Regulation A versus other available
exemptions, Mr. Li noted that Regulation A was the best possible option given
his company's situation and what investor niche he could tap into. He claimed
that 98 percent of the general population is not able to invest in most private
offerings. Mr. Li explained further that the 700+ venture capital firms across
168 See Keen Home, Offering Circular 18 Jan. 31, 2017).
169 See Keen Home, Annual Report (Form 1-K), 3 June 1, 2017).
170 Id
171 Id at 4.
172 Id
173 See Knightscope, Inc., Preliminary Offering Circular (Form 1-A), 20 (Nov. 7, 2016)
[hereinafter Knightscope Form 1-A].
174 See Invest in Knightscope, SEEDINVEST, https://www.seedinvest.com/knightscope/series.m
(last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
175 See Knightscope Form 1-A, supra note 173, at 3.
176 See id.
177 See Knightscope Form 1-A, supra note 173.
178 See Knightscope, Inc., Notice of Qualification (Dec. 23, 2016).
179 See Invest in Knightscope, SEEDINVEST, supra note 174.
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the U.S. tend to invest in information technology, but that what their company
did (law enforcement physical security involving hardware and robotics) was a
complete outlier. So, Knightscope is not a "fit with traditional venture
capitalists."180
As Mr. Li touted the merits in using the Regulation A exemption, he also
commented about the flexibility Regulation A afforded their company as they
were able to set the offering price, the terms, and other conditions.181 When
asked about the ongoing filing requirements, and whether they were a burden
from both a cost and compliance standpoint, Mr. Li felt that the ongoing
financial reporting requirements would force the company to "invoke a level
of accounting discipline and fiscal responsibility into the process."182 Mr. Li
viewed the cost of meeting these reporting requirements as merely a cost of
doing business. Mr. Li saw the requirements as a "semi-benign way to put a
level of discipline into the company."83
As of December 31, 2016 and December 31, 2015, Knightscope had total
assets of $6,329,770 and $7,405,024, respectively.184 For those same periods
the company had total liabilities of $2,252,163 and $1,285,863, respectively.185
The company had net losses of $5,472,547 (2016) and $3,392,277 (2015).186
These net losses were against net revenue of $420,425 (2016) and $29,770
(2015).187
MEDALIST DIVERSIFIED REIT, INC.: The final company I
interviewed, Medalist Diversified REIT, Inc. is a Real Estate Investment Trust
("REIT"). To qualify as a REIT the company must follow certain compliance
guidelines. For example, one of the key compliance requirements for REITS
is that 95 percent of their gross income is derived from dividends.'88
I spoke with Mr. Thomas Messier, one of the Company's directors and its
Co-President.189  When asked about his company's decision to choose
Regulation A, he explained that he "didn't want to go the Regulation D route
180 Telephone Interview with William Santana Li, Chairman and CEO, Knightscope, Inc. (Feb.




184 Knightscope, Inc., Annual Report (Form 1-K), F-4 (Dec. 31, 2016).
185 Id at F-5.
186 Id at F-6.
187 Id
188 See 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(2)(A) (2016).
189 Telephone Interview with Thomas Messier, Director and Co-President, Medalist
Diversified REIT, Inc. (July 31, 2017) (on file with author).
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because [he] didn't want to deal with the whole accredited investor issue."190
Mr. Messier thought Regulation A would be much easier, and in retrospect,
thought the Regulation A offering worked well. Mr. Messier did not see the
ongoing financial reporting requirements as a large burden, but merely a cost
of doing business.
Medalist had total assets of $82 (December 31, 2016) and $126 (December
31, 2015) and total liabilities of $290,795 (December 31, 2016) and $166,712
(December 31, 2015).191 The company reported net losses of $46,247 for the
twelve month period ending December 31, 2016 and $141,836 for the twelve
month period ending December 31, 2015.192 In both years the company
reported no revenue.93
C. Summary and Assessment of Findings
After speaking with the founders of each of these companies, it is evident
that the issues cited earlier in this paper as deterrents-namely the ongoing
reporting requirements, the state registration requirements for Tier 1 filers, and
the undesirability of non-accredited investors-did not seem to be deterrents
to these companies. They saw the ongoing reporting requirements merely as a
cost of doing business and, overall, beneficial to their operations. None of
them seemed to have issues with their lengthy qualification process.
Additionally, they all felt the ability to raise money from non-accredited
investors was a significant advantage rather than a burden; it was a big factor
in their decision to use Regulation A in the first place.
Though I acknowledge that my actual findings seem to run contrary to
what I was anticipating, I do make the following observations. The first is that
all of these companies are start-up companies with very little, if any, operating
history. They are all subsisting on seed money or early round capital
investment. None of them are self-sustaining by generating sustainable
operational profits, and some have not even started generating revenue yet. It
remains to be seen how these companies will fair going forward. Though I am
wishing the best for all of them, statistically speaking, at least three quarters of
these companies are likely to fail by year five. And though the early stage
compliance may not seem like a burden at this juncture, time will tell whether
190 Id
191 See Medalist Diversified REIT, Inc., Annual Report (Form 1-K), 30 (Apr. 28, 2017).
192 Id. at 31.
193 Id
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it is something that will factor prominently in their cost structure going
forward.
Presently, all of them seem to be operating in the early stage euphoria that
comes with having a promising idea or concept that is still in the start-up
honeymoon stage where the focus is still on the concept's promise or potential
and hasn't yet shifted to whether the concept is actually making money. Only
time will tell whether these companies' feelings regarding Regulation A and its
requirements may change once their focus shifts to profitability rather than
product development. I want to conclude this article with a discussion of this
very concern.
VII. ELIO MOTORS: A CAUTIONARY TALE? A HARBINGER OF THINGS
TO COME?
Elio Motors was the first high profile company to successfully complete a
Regulation A+ offering. The company raised approximately $15.82 million.194
Their success was highly publicized in private offering circles.95 The offering's
aftermath, however, reveals concerns inherent in the Regulation A+ offering.
Specifically, the combination of (1) offerings for large amounts of capital, and
(2) a pool of investors consisting primarily of non-accredited investors.
Elio Motors has yet to generate a single dollar of revenue. Their income
statement for the 12-month periods ending December 31, 2015 and December
31, 2016 showed net losses of $22,594,195 and $52,719,773, respectively.196
Unsurprisingly, the company is also burning through cash. Its 2015 balance
sheet showed cash of $6,870,044 while twelve months later, that number
dwindled to just $120,206.197 Additionally, the company is incurring a
significant amount of debt. As of December 31, 2016, the company's total
liabilities (both current and long term) totaled $93,806,238, $26,035,436 of
which represents "[n]onrefundable customer deposits"198 (i.e., customers who
have already paid for cars that will not be available until 2019, if at all).
194 See Elio Motors, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), 37 (Aug. 3,2017) [hereinafter Elio
Motors Form S-1]. Companies use the Form S-1 in connection with an Initial Public
Offering. In addition to Elio's Regulation A+ filing, which occurred in 2015-2016, Elio is
now seeking public investment through this IPO offering.
195 See Helen Miazga, E/o Motors Raises Capital ith RegA+ IPO, WRHAMBRECHT & CO. (Mar.
8, 2016), https://wrhambrecht.com/news/elio-motors-raises-capital-with-reg-a-ipo/.
196 See Elio Motors Form S-1, supra note 194, at 7.
197 Id at 36.
198 Id at F-3.
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Nonetheless, Elio's executive team is being very well compensated:
* Paul Elio, the Company's Chief Executive Officer
received a salary of $250,000 for both 2015 and 2016.199
* Hari Iyer, the Company's Chief Operating Officer
received a salary of $104,167 in 2016, and $250,000 in
2015.200
* Connie Grennan, the Company's Chief Financial Officer
received a salary of $175,000 in 2016 and $150,000 in
2015.201
A critic has noted the importance of hiring the "best and the brightest" to
give the company the best chance of success.202 But "in the case of Elio
Motors, a company that has not generated any revenues, it is hard to swallow
$250,000 salaries for officers [who] also hold 87.1% of the outstanding stock.
Paul Elio, CEO and Chairman, holds 65.8% of the outstanding stock, meaning
he sets his own salary."203
In short, those who invested in Elio Motors' Regulation A+ offering are
likely to lose all or a good portion of their investment if Elio Motors does not
resolve its production issues and start actually making cars. The company's
earliest projections for rolling its three-wheeled prototype, the "Elio," off the
production line is 2019.204 And the company says it will need another $376
million to begin production.205
Regulation A+ critics have found the situation with Elio Motors
troubling.206 At least one has noted that less savvy investors can be unduly
influenced by all the hoopla and fanfare that surrounds Regulation A+
offerings. 207 Although Elio Motors filly disclosed its financial position, a critic
199 Id at 70.
200 Id
201 Id




204 See Rio Motors Form S-1, supra note 194, at 8.
205 Id at 40.
206 See general) Sidoti, supra note 202.
207 See genera! Id
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worried whether these less sophisticated investors had the appropriate filter to
properly assess the investment risk associated with Elio Motors' stock.208
The situation with Elio Motors highlights what some feel is an inherent
problem with Regulation A+: the problem of the "lay" investor, their relative
vulnerability, and how best to protect them from speculation and uninformed
investments. No doubt investors will lose money in some future Regulation
A+ offerings due to the nature of investing in start-up and growth companies.
But the question here is whether the "lay" investor has the stomach to endure
the high risk/high reward nature of private equity investing. Or is this a
situation where the concern for the "lay" investor's vulnerability and exposure
will lead to such scrutiny that the risk involved may ultimately price Regulation
A+ offering out of the market? Only time will tell, but the vulnerabilities of
these less sophisticated investors, coupled with the high potential for losses
from investing in these startup companies, may be a combination that
ultimately causes issuers to pivot away from the Regulation A+ offering toward
Regulation D and other more traditional exempt offering regimes.
CONCLUSION
To some extent, I stand corrected: when I started this foray into Regulation
AI had already drawn conclusions about the effect of the JOBS Act revisions.
But, I found that my assumptions about the relative strength of Regulation A's
deterrents were not shared by all issuers. I chose to write this article and its
predecessor in order to examine the path of a once dormant exempt offering
option and an attempt at its resurrection. Without question issuers have turned
to Regulation A in considerable numbers. Although issues such as state
registration requirements and ongoing reporting requirements do not appear to
turn all issuers away.
I do make this concession with caution, however. Regulation A+ is still in
a stage of relative infancy. Most of the companies that are part of our sample
are early stage companies and have not yet dealt with the long-term effects of
choosing Regulation A+. To be clear, I submit that most of the issuers we
considered have not been forced to consider the long-term consequences of
their exemption choice and thus we should proceed with some hesitancy when
evaluating their decision to utilize Regulation A+.
Additionally, Elio Motors may serve as a harbinger for the Regulation A+
offering exemption. With large numbers of non-accredited ("lay") investors




numbers, the question looms, what will be the potential fallout if companies
like Elio Motors and other start-ups similarly situated end up failing? Will these
lay investors be able to take these losses in stride as the more indoctrinated
accredited investor has done for years?
In the end, I applaud Congress for making the effort to revise Regulation
A to improve it, make it more appealing and more accessible. But like most
things, every action has a reaction, a by-product, or an unintended
consequence. Things are in motion now with the new and improved
Regulation A+ now fully engaged. And yes, there is no question that issuers
have responded to the improvements by making use of the Regulation A+
offering exemption in unprecedented numbers. In this second writing, the
effort was made to reveal both the good and the potential bad with Regulation
A+. To some extent, I stand corrected. But with this now more open investing
model, the question remains, whether Regulation A+ as improved, will be a
success or will the revival ultimately fail under the weight of the new investors
that the Regulation ultimately is seeking to reach. Only time will tell. I look
forward to someone else picking up the baton from this point and carrying it
forward.
12:243 (2018) 279
Virginia La) & Business Redew
APPENDIX A
Historical Regulation A Use
Resulwdman, 116 Regulation A Filingsin 1997.
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TIER 1 AVG. MIN. OFFERING $555,952
TIER 1 AVG MAX. OFFERING $7,643,434
TIER 2 AVG. MIN. OFFERING $948,638
TIER 2 AVG. MAX. OFFERING $23,032,241
TIER 1 FILERS GETTING
QUALIFIED 12/21 =57.1%
TIER 2 FILERS GETTING
QUALIFIED 17/29= 58.6%
TIER 1 FILERS -AVG. TIME TO
QUALIFICATION 375
TIER 2 FILERS -AVG. TIME TO
QUALIFICATION 120
AVERAGE TOTAL ASSETS TIER 1 $13,168,719





AVERAGE REVENUE TIER 1 $54,071
AVERAGE REVENUE TIER 2 $612,371
AVERAGE NET LOSS TIER 1 -$34,182
AVERAGE NET LOSS TIER 2 -$481,334
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